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This  paper  argues  that  countercyclical  fiscal  policy  can  smooth  business 
cycles  and  in  doing  so  alleviate  liquidity  constraints  and  thereby  in 
crease  growth.  The  authors  present  empirical  work  that  they  interpret  as 
saying  that  this  opportunity  is  most  pronounced  in  countries  where  fi 
nancial  development  is  low.  I am  sympathetic  to  the  idea  that  time 
varying  liquidity  constraints  can  be  an  important  aggregate  problem. 
But,  for  reasons  explained  in  the  following,  I doubt  that  the  evidence  in 
this  paper  will  convince  skeptics  that  this  is  the  case.  I begin  by  review 
ing  some  conceptual  points  and  then  spend  most  of my  remarks  dis 
cussing  their  empirical  work. 
1  Conceptual  Issues 
The  theoretical  foundations  for  the view  that  recessions  are  times  when 
liquidity  constraints  become  more  binding  are  solid.  Likewise,  there  is 
evidence  such  as  that  provided  by  Aghion,  Angeletos,  Banerjee,  and 
Manova  (2006)  showing  that  liquidity  constraints  are more  of  a problem 
in countries  where  financial  development  is  low. Additionally,  there  is a 
large  literature  suggesting  that  firm-level  investment  is sensitive  to cash 
flow,  cash  on  hand,  and  collateral  values  (even  after  controlling  for  in 
vestment  opportunities).  Thus  many  of  the  ingredients  of  the  story  in 
this  paper  are well-established.  The  new  claim  in  this paper  is that  fiscal 
policy  can  be  used  to  smooth  business  cycles  and  thus  mitigate  con 
straints  and  enhance  growth.  The  authors  go  so  far  as  to  argue  that 
"growth  in  the EMU  countries  could  be  fostered  if the budget  deficit  be 
came  more  counter-cyclical."  (p. 272,  this  volume) 
There  are  several  reasons  to be  skeptical  about  this  policy  advice.  Al 
though  only  mentioned  in a  footnote  by  the  authors,  perhaps  the most 288  Kashyap 
commonly  cited  argument  in  the  other  direction  is  the  crowding  out  ar 
gument.  It has  been  routinely  alleged  in  the U.S.  debate  over  fiscal  pol 
icy  (e.g., Rubin  and Weisberg  [2004])  that higher  government  borrowing 
raises  interest  rates  and  reduces  private  investment.  While  I agree  with 
Engen  and Hubbard  (2004)  that  in  the United  States  the  actual  evidence 
for  this  proposition  is  weak,  it  is possible  that  in  countries  with  under 
developed  financial  markets  this mechanism  could  be  operative. 
More  importantly,  the  presumption  in  the  policy  advice  is  that  fiscal 
policy  is nimble  enough  to be  used  to  fine  tune  the business  cycle.  Auer 
bach  (2002,144)  explores  this possibility  and  concludes  "there  is little  ev 
idence  that  discretionary  fiscal  policy  has  played  an  important  stabi 
lization  role  during  recent  decades,  both  because  of  the  potential 
weakness  of  its effects  and  because  some  of  its effects  [with  respect  to  in 
vestment]  have  been  poorly  timed."  Feldstein  (2002,  151),  in his  pub 
lished  comment  on Auerbach's  paper,  writes  "although  Auerbach's  ev 
idence  is  innovative  and  impressive,  he  recognizes  that  it  confirms 
views  that  are  now  well-established  and  widely  held  in  the  profession. 
Even  economists  who  did  not  consider  themselves  to  be  monetarists 
came  to  this  conclusion  on  the basis  of  their  own  research."  I concur  with 
Feldstein  that macroeconomists  as  a group  are  suspicious  of  fine-tuning 
arguments  in general  and  using  fiscal  policy  in particular. 
Especially  in this  context,  the  argument  for  managing  the problem  us 
ing  aggregate  budget  policy  seems  rather  weak.  If  the  root  problem  is 
fluctuating  borrowing  capacity,  then  instead  of  the  blunt  tool  of  extra 
spending,  one  can  imagine  many  more  direct  government  programs  to 
address  this  concern. 
Finally,  the mechanism  that  the  authors  seek  to uncover  is necessarily 
subtle.  As  indicated  in  their  figure  4.1,  they  imagine  a  scenario  in  which 
budget  policy  potentially  affects  trend  growth.  Yet  the  regressions  that 
they  run  start  by  looking  at  the  connection  between  deficit  spending  and 
the  output  gap.  Given  the  filtering  that  is done  to  remove  the  trend,  the 
regressions  that  are  proposed  are  uninformative  about  the  hypothesis 
that  they  seek  to  test. Moreover,  it is not  clear  how  panel  data  regressions 
of  this  sort  could  overcome  this  difficulty. 
Regardless  of what  one  thinks  about  the  theoretical  possibilities  re 
garding  countercyclical  deficit  spending  in  comparison  to other  policy 
options,  the main  contribution  of  this paper  is empirical.  Therefore  I  will 
spend  the  balance  of my  remarks  reviewing  the  regression  evidence  in 
the paper. Comment  289 
2  Empirical  Evidence 
The  authors  adopt  a  two-step  procedure  for building  their  case.  In  the 
first  stage,  the  increase  in debt  (relative  to GDP)  is regressed  on  the GDP 
gap.  The  coefficient  on  the  gap  is  modeled  as  a  time-vary  ing  parameter 
(that  I  will  call  the  countercyclicality  coefficients).  The  authors  graph  the 
countercyclicality  coefficients  from  their  three  estimation  measures  for 
the United  States  in  their  figure  4.2. My  figure  4C2.1  shows  the  under 
lying  data  that were  used  to derive  their  countercyclicality  coefficients. 
Without  any  detailed  knowledge  of American  fiscal  policy  one  can  see 
that  the  period  from  1993  to  2000  stands  out.  The  authors'  preferred 
auto-regressive  (AR) procedure  forces  a  smooth  correlation  but  I am  not 
convinced  that  doing  so  is  an  appropriate  way  to  describe  history. 
Rather  I view  the  1993-2000  period  as  an  outlier  and  the periods  before 
and  after  as having  fairly  similar  fiscal  regimes.  One  way  to demonstrate 
this  is  to  run  a  fixed-coefficient  version  of  their  first-stage  regression 
from  1965  to  1992  and  then  simulate  the  subsequent  years.  The  fitted  val 
ues  from  this  exercise  are  shown  in  figure  4C2.2.  One  can  see  that while 
this  equation  describes  the  1993-2000  period  badly,  it fits  the  subsequent 
years  quite  well.  Accordingly,  I am  skeptical  of  the  authors'  restriction 
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Figure  4C2.1 
Budget  Deficit  and  the GDP  Gap  for  the United  States 290  Kashyap 
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Figure  4C2.2 
Predicted  and  Actual  Budget  Deficit  for  the United  States 
that  forces  the  countercyclicality  coefficients  to  smoothly  vary  over 
time. 
The  second  step  in  the  procedure  relates  per  capita  growth  to  the 
countercyclicality  coefficients,  (the  lag  of)  the  level  of  private  credit  rel 
ative  to GDP,  and  the  countercyclicality  coefficients  interacted  with  the 
lag  of private  credit  to GDP,  as well  as  a number  of  other  controls.  There 
are  several  questionable  aspects  of  this  regression.  While  regressions 
of  this  sort  are  common  in  the  literature  on  long-run  growth,  they  seem 
ill-suited  to  explaining  short-term  fluctuations.  Surely  the  year-to-year 
fluctuations  in  the  ratio  of  credit  to GDP  are  endogenous  to growth,  and 
lagging  the variable  by  one  year  hardly  helps.  Most  of  the  other  controls 
are  also  jointly  determined  with  growth. 
Another  issue  is  that  in  the  second-step  regression  the  countercycli 
cality  coefficients  are  transformed  to  account  for  the  fact  that  they  are 
generated  regressors.  While  this  is a reasonable  econometric  concern,  in 
this  application  the  effect  is  remarkably  important.  For  instance,  figure 
4C2.3  (which  matches  figure  4.3  in  the paper)  creates  the  impression  that 
the  identification  in  the  second  step  comes  from  sustained  large  differ 
ences  between  fiscal  policy  in different  countries  (in  this  case,  the United Comment  291 
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Figure  4C2.3 
Aghion  and  Marinescu  Countercyclicality  Coefficients 
States  and United  Kingdom).  But  the AR(1)  estimation  procedure  in  the 
first  step  will  work  best  when  there  are many  years  of  data.  Thus,  the 
sampling  uncertainty  is extremely  high  at  the beginning  and  ends  of  the 
sample.  Figure  4C2.4  shows  the weights  for  the  countercyclicality  coef 
ficients  from  figure  4C2.3;  the  same  inverted-U  pattern  holds  for  all  the 
other  countries  that  are not  shown  in  this  graph.  Consequently,  the vari 
ables  that  are  fed  into  the  growth  regression  for  the United  States  and 
United  Kingdom  are  shown  in  figure  4C2.5. 
Once  the  first-step  estimation  is  accounted  for,  the  differences  be 
tween  the  fiscal  policies  of  the United  States  and  United  Kingdom  are 
much  less  pronounced  than  implied  by  figure  4C2.3.  Judging  from  fig 
ure  4C2.5  we  can  see  that  the  explanatory  power  of  the  countercyclical 
ity  coefficients  will  depend  mostly  on  the  income  dynamics  toward  the 
middle  of  the  sample.  It seems  likely  to  me  that what  the  interaction  co 
efficients  in  these  regressions  are  telling  us  is  that OECD  countries  with 
less  developed  financial  systems  grew  faster  over  these  years.  Given  the 
convergence  within  the  European  Union  during  this  time,  this would 
not  be  surprising.  In any  event,  the  connection  to  the  cyclicality  of  bud 
get  policy  is  murky. 121  s^^  \ 
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Figure  4C2.5 
Transferred  Countercyclicality  Coefficients  Used  in Aghion-Marinescu  Growth  Regres 
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3  Conclusion 
The  idea  that  time-varying  liquidity  constraints  are macroeconomically 
relevant  is plausible.  The  authors  make  the bold  claim  that  these  effects 
are  so powerful  that  aggregate  fiscal  policy  should  be  aimed  at  alleviat 
ing  them.  I am  skeptical  that  this would  be  the best  way  to address  this 
potential  problem  and  do  not  think  the  empirical  work  in this  paper  will 
convince  other  skeptics. 
Acknowledgments 
I thank  Pedro  Gete  for outstanding  research  assistance  and  Stephen  Cec 
chetti  and  Pedro  Gete  for helpful  conversations  in preparing  these  com 
ments  and  the  Initiative  on Global  Markets  at  the University  of Chicago 
for  research  support. 
References 
Aghion,  Philippe,  George-Marios  Angeletos,  Abhijit  V.,  Banerjee,  and  Kalina  B. Manova. 
2006.  Volatility  and  growth:  Credit  constraints  and  productivity-enhancing  investment. 
NBER  Working  Paper  no.  11349.  Cambridge,  MA:  National  Bureau  of  Economic  Research. 
Auerbach,  Alan  J. 2002.  Is  there  a  role  for  discretionary  fiscal  policy?  In Rethinking  stabi 
lization  policy,  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Kansas  City  Papers  and  Proceedings,  109-50. 
Kansas  City,  MO:  Federal  Reserve  Bank. 
Engen,  Eric M.,  and  R.  Glenn  Hubbard.  2005.  Federal  government  debt  and  interest  rates. 
In NBER  Macroeconomics  Annual  2004,  ed. M.  Gertler  and  K.  Rogoff,  83-136.  Cambridge: 
MIT  Press. 
Feldstein,  Martin.  2002.  Commentary:  Is  there  a  role  for  discretionary  fiscal  policy?  In Re 
thinking  stabilization  policy,  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of Kansas  City  Papers  and  Proceedings, 
151-62.  Kansas  City,  MO:  Federal  Reserve  Bank. 
Rubin,  Robert  E.,  and  Jacob Weisberg.  2004.  Uncertain  world:  Tough  choices  from  Wall  Street 
to  Washington.  New  York:  Random  House. 